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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The writ of garnishment which is the subject of this appeal was filed in
a divorce proceeding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Appeals by
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(h)(2005).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
FOR REVIEW
I. Whether the trial court erred by finding that the Acceptance of
Inheritance and General Release Plaintiff signed in favor of the Trustee,
upon Plaintiff's receipt of a bequest to her from the Trust, bars her from
garnishing funds held by the same Trustee for the benefit of the
judgment debtor for an unrelated claim for child support.
Standard of Review:

A release is construed under contract principles.

Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42,

~

interpretation of a contract is a question of law.
conclusions regarding a contract

9, 48 P.3d 941.

The

The trial court's legal

we given no deference and are reviewed for

correctness. Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., 1999 UT 69, ~ 6, 983 P.2d 575.
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Preserved for review:

This issue was preserved for rev1ew m the

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Response to
Motion to Quash Garnishment. (R. p. 85) 1

II. Whether the trial court erred by relying on the spendthrift
provision of the Trust to deny Plaintiff's motion under Rule 59(a)(7).
Standard of Review: The decision of a trial court to deny a motion for new

trial is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Hart v. Salt Lake
County Comm., 945 P.2d 125, 135 (Utah App. 1997). Conclusions of law are

reviewed for correctness. !d. at 132. In the present case, the trial court relied
on a conclusion of law to deny the motion. This conclusion of law should be
reviewed for correctness.
Preserved for review: This issue was preserved for review in Plaintiffs

Reply to Garnishee's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Pursuant to Rule
59(a)(7) for Reconsideration or New Trial on the Court's Order Quashing
Writ of Garnishment. (R. p. 11 0).

1

The following abbreviation is used: R. for Record.
7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the case.
This is an appeal from the Order Granting Motion to Quash
entered by the Third District Judicial Court and from the subsequent Order
Denying Motion Pursuant to Rule 59(A)(7) for Reconsideration or New Trial
on the Court's Order Quashing Writ of Garnishment. (R. pp. 107, 158)
B. Course of proceedings.
Plaintiff served a writ of garnishment dn the Trustee of the
Charlotte Booth Revocable Trust. [Hereinafter "Trustee"]. Trustee filed a
Motion to Quash Writ of Garnishment and a memorandum in support thereof.
(R. p. 59). Plaintiff filed a Memorandum ofPoints and Authorities in Support
of Plaintiffs Response to Motion to Quash Garnishment. (R. p. 85) Trustee
filed a Reply to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiffs Response to Motion to Quash Garnishmeht. (R. p. 93 ).

After

hearing arguments of counsel, the trial court, in a minute entry dated August 2,
2004, granted Trustee's motion and quashed the garnishment. (R. p. 104). An
Order Granting Motion to Quash was filed September 10, 2004. (R. p. 107).
Plaintiff filed a Motion Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7) for Reconsideration or New
Trial on the Court's Order Quashing Writ of Garnishment and a supporting
memorandum. (R. p. 110).

Garnishee filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs
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Motion. (R. p. 121). Plaintiff filed a Reply to Garnishee's Opposition. (R. p.
142).
C. Disposition in the court below:

The trial court entered an Order Denying Motion Pursuant to Rule
59(A)(7) for Reconsideration or New Trial on the Court's Order Quashing
Writ of Garnishment. (R. p. 158). Plaintiff then filed her Notice of Appeal.
(R. p. 161).
D. Statement of relevant f~cts:

Plaintiff divorced John W. Booth, defendant, on January 26, 1988. (R.
p. 12). The decree of divorce directed Defendant to pay child support, which
he has not done. (R. p. 12). Plaintiff holds an unsatisfied judgment against
Defendant for child support in the amount of$22, 115.05, plus interest. (R. p.
55). Garnishee, who is Defendant's brother, is trustee of a trust created by
their deceased mother, Charlotte Brown Booth. (R. p. 70). Charlotte Booth
died on December 2, 2002, and the Trust terminated as provided in paragraph
13 thereof, whereupon the beneficiaries under the Trust became entitled to
payment of all gifts made therein. (R. p. 75). Charlotte Booth made a gift to
Plaintiff in the Trust. (R. p. 86). When Trustee paid that gift to Plaintiff, he
requested and received a document entitled "Acceptance of Inheritance and
General Release." [Hereinafter "Acceptance of Inheritance"].

9

(R. p. 68).

Charlotte Booth also made a gift to Defendant in the Trust, but he cannot be
located, and payment has not been made to him.

(R. p. 17).

Trustee

continues to hold funds belonging to Defendant. Plaintiff filed a writ of
garnishment seeking to recover money belonging to Defendant, but still held
by Trustee. (R. p. 58). Trustee moved to quash the garnishment. (R. p. 59).
From the subsequent litigation this appeal ensues.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGuMENT

This case hinges on two questions. First, whether a release given in
connection with a particular matter can be construed so broadly as to prevent
a writ of garnishment directed to the releasee seeking funds of a third party in
a wholly unrelated matter. The second question is whether the spendthrift
provision of a trust is sufficient to shield the beneficiary's funds against a
judgment for unpaid child support once the beneficiary is entitled to be paid
the funds.
The Acceptance of Inheritance purported to release the Trust and
Trustee from "all liability, claim, or demand." A garnishment is none of these.
The garnishee is a stakeholder and a mere depository with no claim to the
property. Ordinarily a stakeholder is not even considered a real party in
interest in court proceedings.

A garnishment proceeding is merely a

10

component of the due administration of justice. A release is intended to end a
controversy, to foreclose further claims, or to protect from liability. None of
these purposes is served by expanding the breadth of its protection to prevent
a gamishor from obtaining funds due a third party.
Further, the general rule is that a release that contains both words of
general release and references to a particular matter is limited to the specific
controversy. The Acceptance of Inheritance contains reference to the faithful
performance of the Trustee's duties. Clearly, the contemplation of the parties
was to release him and the Trust from any claims related to the amount of
distribution to the Plaintiff and from any claims of failure to properly perform
the duties of the Trustee.
The trial court relied on the spendthrift provision of the trust to quash
the garnishment. Although Utah certainly recognizes spendthrift trusts, they
are not inviolate. Courts generally recognize that, absent language in the trust
to prevent such treatment, once a beneficiary becomes entitled to receive
funds from a trust they may be attached before he receives them. This is
consistent with the public policy that a person may not tie up his own
property in such a way that he can enjoy it but so that a creditor may not reach
it. The Defendant may not simply leave funds to which he is immediately
entitled within a spendthrift trust and retain the protection of the trust.

11

Section 75-7-506 of the Utah Code Annotated permits a creditor to
reach a spendthrift trust when the trustee has not made a distribution within a
reasonable time. The trial court determined that the proceeds could not be
distributed until the beneficiary was presumed dead. This delay of five years
constitutes far more than a reasonable delay.
Competing public policies meet when a judgment for unpaid child
support is presented with a spendthrift trust. The court must balance the right
of the settlor to dispose of his property as he pleases against the decided
pdlicy in favor of enforcement of obligations for child support and alimony.
The prevailing view is that proceeds of a spendthrift trust may be used to
satisfy claims for child support. By statute Utah adopts this view. Section
75-7-503 specifically permits the holder of a judgment for child support to
obtain an order attaching present or future distributions to the beneficiary.
Neither the words of general release found in the Acceptance of
Inheritance nor the provisions of the spendthrift trust provide sufficient basis
for the trial court to quash the writ of garnishment against the Trustee.
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ARGUMENT

Issue I.

Whether the trial court erred by finding that the

Acceptance of Inheritance and General Release Plaintiff signed in favor
of the Trustee, upon Plaintiffs receipt of a bequest to her from the Trust,
bars her from garnishing funds held by the same Trustee for the benefit
of the judgment debtor for an unrelated claim for child support.
a. A garnishment does not constitute a "liability, claim or demand"
within the meaning of the release.
The Trustee asserts the novel defense that the "Acceptance of
Inheritance and General Release" that Joan B. Booth, Plaintiff, signed before
delivery of funds to which she was rightfully entitled now somehow bars her
from garnishing funds that the trustee holds for John W. Booth, Defendant.
Such an assertion substantially misapprehends the nature and purpose of
garnishment proceedings.
The question of whether a general release extends to a garnishment
action or any action involving a disinterested stakeholder on an unrelated
matter is one of first impression in this jurisdiction. Similarly, no other
jurisdiction appears to have considered this issue.
A two part inquiry is appropriate. First, whether the language of the
Acceptance of Inheritance which purports to release the Trust and the Trustee
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"from any and all liability, claim or demand whatsoever" extends to a
garnishment action.

Secondly, whether language of "general release"

contained within a document extends beyond the subject matter of the
document.
Garnishment allows a judgment creditor to satisfy a judgment by
reaching property owed to the judgment debtor by a third party. Whitney v.
Faulkner, 2004 UT 52,~ 18, 95 P.3d 270. Through garnishment proceedings,

the garnishee's debt to the judgment debtor becomes due to the judgment
creditor. Id The garnishee is typically a neutral party in the garnishment
proceedings. /d.
A garnishment proceeding is, in essence, an action by the judgment
debtor for the benefit of a judgment creditor which is brought against a third
party, the garnishee, who holds the assets of the judgment debtor. Parkville
Fed. Sav. Bank v. Maryland Nat'/ Bank, 343 Md. 412, 681 A.2d 521 (Md.

App. 1996).
The Trustee, as a garnishee defendant, is merely a stakeholder.
Henderson & Johnson v. Hooper Sugar Co., 65 Utah 241, 248, 236 P.239,

241 (1925). "A stakeholder is one who is a mere depositary of property in
which he has no interest and to which he makes no claim, which he admits
belongs to one or the other of rival claimants, and as to which he has only the
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naked authority to deliver to one or the other on the happening or
nonhappening of a certain contingency." Glassman v. Glassman, 309 N.Y.
436, 448; 131 N.E.2d 721, 728 (1956)(1. Desmond dissenting).
A stakeholder is not ordinarily seen as a real party in interest. Judge
Posner referred to garnishees and other stakeholders as nominal defendants.
Matchett v. Wold, 818 F. 2d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 1987).

The federal courts have considered whether a garnishee was in a legal
sense actually subject to a claim. In Armstrong Cover Co. v. Whitfield, 418 F.
Supp. 972, 973 (N.D. Ga. 1976) the court considered whether the U.S. Postal
Service could remove a garnishment matter to federal court. The district
court reasoned that only a defendant could remove a case to federal court. ld.
Further, the question of whether the Postal Service was a defendant did not
tum on its designation as such in the garnishment proceedings.

Jd.

Ultimately, the district court concluded that a garnishee was a nominal party.
I d. at 974. Citing Moore's Federal Practice, the court ultimately held that a

garnishee is not a defendant entitled to remove an action to federal court. !d.
The effect of a garnishment is to make the garnishee the trustee of the
funds of the defendant. Continental Nat'/ Bank v. Tavourmina, 10 F.3d 761,
764 (11th Cir. 1993). The garnishee has no liability to the garnishor unless a
valid judgment is entered against him. Upper Blue Bench Irrigation Dist. v.
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Continental Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 93 Utah 325, 335; 72 P.2d 1048, 1053

( 193 7). The garnishee is a stranger to the principal case and an involuntary
participant in the garnishment proceedings. Pangea Technologies, Inc. v.
Internet Promotions, Inc, 2004 UT 40, ~ 6, 94 P.3d 257. Similarly, the issuer

of a garnishment simply stands in the shoes of and is subrogated to the rights
of the creditor. Lang v. Lang, 17 Utah 2d 10, 12; 403 P.2d 655, 656 (1965).
Every garnishee is necessarily put to some inconvenience, and perhaps,
may be put to some expense, in complying with the order of the court. West
Cache Sugar Co. v. Hendrickson, 56 Utah 327, 336; 190 P. 946, 949 (1920).

In West Cache Sugar Co. a bank resisted a garnishment order that directed
that a safety deposit box be opened, claiming that the box would be damaged.
West Cache Sugar Co., 56 Utah at 333. The Court rejected this claim of

inconvenience saying, "Such matters are too trivial, however, to be urged as a
means of arresting or impeding the due administration of justice." Jd. at p.
336.
No claim is made against the Trustee. Rather, claim is made against
the funds he holds for John W. Booth. Clearly, as a mere stakeholder, the
Trustee was not subjected to liability by the garnishment. Neither was any
claim or demand upon him in a legal sense, beyond that which might be
required of any citizen who holds the funds of another. Neither he nor the
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Trust is made subject to a claim, liability, or demand in a legal sense
sufficient to invoke the words of general release granted in a matter unrelated
to the garnishment action.

b. The language of "general release" contained within a document
does not extend beyond the subject matter of the document.
(1)

The purpose of the release is not served by barring a

garnishment action.

The scope of a release may best be determined by looking to the
purpose of the release. Various pronouncements have been made by courts in
this regard. It has been held that the purpose of a release is to put an end to
the matter in controversy. See Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States,
812 F.2d 1387, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

Another court has held that the

purpose is to foreclose further claims.

See Zollman v. Geneva Leasing

Assocs., 780 N.E.2d 387, 392 (Ind. App. 2002).

Perhaps the broadest

interpretation was provided in Farner v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 748 F.2d
551, 555 (lOth Cir. 1984) where the court stated, "The purpose of a release is
to protect against liability ...."
From these cases it can be seen that the broadest reasonable purpose for
a release is to protect against liability. However, a garnishee has no liability
absent a judgment against him. Upper Blue Bench Irrigation Dist., 93 Utah at
17

335; 72 P.2d at 1053. Thus the broadest purpose of a release does not extend
to garnishment actions.
(2).

A release containing references to tioth a specific

controversy and wotds of general release is limited to tbe specific matter
mentioned.

At common law a release directed to a specitic controversy but which
included words of general release was limited to the specific claims. Judge
Learned Hand wrote for the court in Vines v. General Outdoor Advertising

Co., Inc., 171 F.2d 487 (2nd Cir. 1948). In Vines a document released "all
claims and demands of any kind whatsoever to the date hereof, and
particularly ... any claims for salary, commissions or other compensations ...."

Vines, 171 F .2d at 492. The Circuit Court of Appeals noted that "the courts
of New York accept the common law doctrine that in a release words of
general import, followed or preceded by words relating to specific claims, are,

ceteris paribus, limited to the specific claims." /d. Thus a claim under the
Anti-Trust Acts was allowed to proceed. /d.
A similar result was reached in Whitehead v. Fleet Towing Co., 442
N.E.2d 1362 (Ill. App. 1982). In Whitehead a garnishee insurance company
claimed that words of general release protected it, the excess insurer, from
liability. /d. at 1365. The court rejected this contention by stating,
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"Although the release is couched in language normally found in
general releases, we cannot accept garnishee's construction.
Under Illinois law, when an instrument contains recitals of, or
other references to, specific claims and also words of general
release, the words of general release are limited to the particular
claim to which reference is made. "

I d.
Certainly Utah courts have considered challenges to releases. Releases
have been upheld when injuries or damages were greater than the claimant
had anticipated.

See Carter v. Kingsford, 557 P.2d 1005, 1006 (Utah

1976)(upholding release where there were unknown consequences from a
known injury); see also American Towers Owners v. CCI Mechanical, 930
P.2d 1182, 1187 (Utah 1996)(upheld release where some problems unknown
when release was executed). Each instance in which the release was upheld
was in connection with a greater or additional claim arising out of the
circumstances that gave rise to release in the first place.

This does not

suggest that Utah did not adopt the common law rule explained by Judge
Hand in Vines v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., Inc.
Rather, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Simonson v. Travis, 728 P.2d
999 (Utah 1986),
"Courts of equity will restrict a general release to the thing or
things intended to be released. As on a release of all demands,
when some particular demand was in view, the court of chancery
will not allow the releasee to take advantage of the general words
to defeat the collection of a demand not then in the minds of the
parties."
19

!d. at 1002.(quoting 66 Am. Jur. 2d Release §55).

This is precisely in line with the common law rule that mention of a
specific matter in a release limits the application of general terms of release to
that specific matter. The Acceptance of Inheritance refers both to the fact that
the Trustee acted with fidelity, diligence and integrity in administering the
trust and that the amount received was the correct and appropriate amount.
Clearly, the contemplation of the parties was that Plaintiff was releasing all
claims against the Trustee for failure to perform his duties properly or for
failure to deliver the correct sum to Plaintiff. It would be unjust to permit
general terms of release to be so far extended in their application that they
protect, not the Trustee, but rather a judgment debtor against a lawful
collection effort.

Issue 11. Whether the trial court erted by relying on the spendthrift
provision of the trust to quash the writ of garnishment.
In its Order Denying Motion Pursuant to Rule 59(A)(7) For
Reconsideration or New Trial on the Court's Order Quashing Writ of
Garnishment the trial court determined that "its prior ruling was appropriate
in lieu (sic) of the Trust's spendthrift trust provision and the fact that the
distribution to defendant has not yet occurred."

20

In its ruling the trial court relied on the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§75-7-502. The statute states as follows:
" Spendthrift provisions for beneficiaries other than the settlor
( 1) A spendthrift provision for a beneficiary other than the
settlor is valid only if it restrains both voluntary and involuntary
transfer of a beneficiary's interest, even if the beneficiary is the
trustee or cotrustee of the trust.
(2) A term of a trust providing that the interest of a beneficiary
other than the settlor is held subject to a "spendthrift trust," or
words of similar import, is sufficient to restrain both voluntary
and involuntary transfer of the beneficiary's interest.
(3) A beneficiary may not transfer an interest in a trust in
violation of a valid spendthrift provision and, except as otherwise
provided in this part, a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary
may not reach the interest or a distribution by the trustee before
its receipt by the beneficiary."
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-502 (2005).
Three factors serve to render the application of §75-7-502 an
insufficient basis upon which to quash a writ of garnishment. First, by its
terms, the trust terminated on the settlor's death and the defendant's right to
distribution therefrom has fully matured, thus the spendthrift provision was no
longer applicable. {Trust

~13

,

~ll(b),

pages XI and XIII of Addendum).

Secondly, Utah statutes permit a creditor to reach such a distribution if not
made to the beneficiary within a reasonable time. Finally, statutes permit
attachment of assets within a spendthrift trust for unpaid child support.

21

a. Spendthrift provisions of the Trust became inapplicable once
the Defendant was entitled to claim the funds.
The settlor died prior to execution of the Acceptance of Inheritance on
February 14, 2003. (R. p. 86) At the time of the trial court's ruling the settlor
had been dead nearly two years. Paragraph 13 of the Trust states in the
applicable portion, "Except as provided in the Trust with reference to the
Support and Maintenance of Disabled Children, this Trust shall terminate
upon the death of Settlor."( Trust ~13, page XIII of Addendum). Thus, by its
terms the Trust, and its relevant spendthrift provisions, was terminated at the
time the writ of garnishment was executed.
Although it may be argued that the Trust, itself, does not terminate
immediately upon the death of the settlor, cases hold that the spendthrift
provision became inapplicable on that day.
The

Pennsylvania

Supreme

Court

considered

circumstances

substantially identical to those in the case sub judice. In Sproul-Bolton v.
Sproul-Bolton, 383 Pa. 85, 87; 117 A.2d 688, 689 (1955) a defendant was

eligible on his thirtieth birthday to receive a distribution from a trust which
contained a spendthrift clause. The defendant's whereabouts were unknown.
/d.

Immediately following the defendant's thirtieth birthday the plaintiff

served a writ of attachment on the trustee seeking to attach the defendant's
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share in the trust. Sproul-Bolton, 383 Pa. at 88; 117 A.2d at 690. The trustee
filed objections to the writ. !d. The sole question presented to the court was
whether the corpus of the spendthrift trust was immune from attachment by a
creditor of the beneficiary after the latter became entitled to receive it but
before it had been paid to him by the trustee. Sproul-Bolton, 383 Pa. at 87;
117 A.2d at 689.
The Sproul-Bolton court noted that in each case cited by the garnishee
in support of continued immunity the trust in question contained an express
provision granting such immunity. Sproul-Bolton, 383 Pa. at 91; 117 A.2d at
691. The court concluded that,
"the general conclusion to be derived from them [the cases cited]
is, as already stated, that ordinarily the principal of a trust fund,
the right and title to which has vested in the beneficiary and
which has become payable to him, is subject to attachment by his
creditors, and that it is only when the donor or testator who
created the trust has by clear language expressed the intention
that the immunity from attachment or alienation is to continue
until actual payment of the principal to the beneficiary that such
protection in transit will be accorded legal support."
Sproul-Bolton, 383 Pa. at 93; 117 A.2d at 692.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland reached a substantially identical
decision in Brent v. State Cent. Collection Unit, 311 Md. 626, 537 A.2d 227
(Md. App. 1988). In Brent the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust was entitled to
demand payment but, because of his incompetency had not done so. Brent at,
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311 Md. at 628; 537 A.2d at 228. A garnishment was filed and the garnishee
objected.

!d.

The court noted that a substantial number of states had

considered the question and found the following as a statement of policy
found within those cases:
"[i]t is tmiformly held to be against public policy to permit a
person to tie up his own property in such a way that he can still
enjoy it but can prevent his creditors from reaching it."
Brent at, 311 Md. at 634; 537 A.2d at 231.

Further, the court reasoned that key is the right of the beneficiary to the
corpus as distinguished from his actual possession of it. !d.

Thus the

garnishment was proper. Brent at, 311 Md. at 642; 537 A.2d at 234.
John W. Booth had a right to obtain his share of the Trust funds upon
the death of the settlor. It would be unreasonable to permit the Trustee to
protect funds to which John W. Booth was entitled, when Mr. Booth would
not be so entitled were the funds in his possession.
b. The trial court permitted more than a reasonable time for distribution
of the proceeds of the Trust.

The Order Denying Motion Pursuant to Rule 59(A) stated that after five
years without contact the Defendant will be presumed dead and the trust
proceeds distributed. (R. p. 159, page V of Addendum).

Reliance was

apparently placed on Utah Code Ann. §75-1-107(e) which states:
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(e) An individual whose death is not established under
Subsection (l)(a), (b), (c), or (d) who is absent for a continuous
period of five years, during which the individual has not been
heard from, and whose absence is not satisfactorily explained
after diligent search or inquiry, is presumed to be dead. The
individual's death is presumed to have occurred at the end of the
period unless there is sufficient evidence for determining that
death occurred earlier.
Utah Code Ann. §75-1-1 07(e)(2005).
More appropriate would be reliance upon Utah Code Ann. §75-7-506,
which governs such a distribution. This statute states as follows:
"Overdue distribution
Whether or not a trust contains a spendthrift provision, a
creditor or assignee of a beneficiary may reach a mandatory
distribution of income or principal, including a distribution upon
termination of the trust, if the trustee has not made the
distribution to the beneficiary within a reasonable time after the
required distribution date."
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-506 (2005).
The relevant question then hinges on what constitutes a "reasonable
time." Unfortunately, no authority was located for guidance in determining
what period of time might be reasonable under the facts of this case.
However, the trust funds have now been eligible for distribution to John W.
Booth for more than two years. The trial court gave no rationale for delaying
distribution for five years other than at that time Mr. Booth will be presumed
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dead pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §75-1-107(e). (R. p. 159). Plaintiff urges
that this is an insufficient basis for delay in ordering distribution.

c. Public policy favors disregard of spendthrift provisions when
necessary to collect support.

The Restatement (Second) ofTrust § 157(a)(1959) provides:
"Although a trust is a spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the
interest of the beneficiary can be reached in satisfaction of an
enforceable claim against the beneficiary,
(a) by the wife or child of the beneficiary for support, or by the
wife for alimony."
This view has been adopted by many jurisdictions. Two competing
interests of public policy arise in such a situation. The court must balance the
right of a settlor to dispose of his property as he pleases against the decided
policy in favor of the enforcement of obligations for child support and
alimony. Council v. Owens, 28 Ark. App. 49, 53; 770 S.W. 2d 193, 196
(1989). The claim of a wife and dependent children to support is based upon
the clearest grounds of public policy. They are in quite a different position
from ordinary creditors who have voluntarily extended credit.

!d.

The

prevailing view is that the income distributable from a spendthrift trust can be
reached to satisfy claims for unpaid child support and alimony, in the absence
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of a state statute to the contrary. Council, 28 Ark. App. at 52; 770 S.W. 2d at
196.

Rather than a statute to the contrary, Utah has a statute specifically
authorizing such attachment.

Section 75-7-503 specifically permits the

holder judgment for child support to obtain a court order attaching present or
future distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary. It states as follows:

Exceptions to spendthrift provision
(1) In this section, "child" includes any person for whom an
order or judgment for child support has been entered in this or
another state.
(2) Even if a trust contains a spendthrift provision, a beneficiary's
child who has a judgment or court order against the beneficiary
for support or maintenance, or a judgment creditor who has
provided services for the protection of a beneficiary's interest in
the trust, may obtain from a court an order attaching present or
future distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary.
(3) A spendthrift provision is unenforceable against a claim of
this state or the United States to the extent a statute of this state
or federal law so provides.
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-503 (2005).
The public policy of Utah clearly envisions the superiority of a claim
for child support over the competing interests protected by a spendthrift trust.
Although sound legal authority supports the argument that the spendthrift
provision of the Trust is no longer viable, should this Court determine

27

otherwise, Plaintiff should still be permitted to collect her judgment for
unpaid child support.
The practical effect of affirming the decision of the trial court may well
be to permit the absconding debtor to return and collect from the Trustee
funds rightfully owed for support of the defendant's children and then to
depart once again for places unknown.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons cited, the Order Granting Motion To Quash entered by
the Third District Court should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
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RECBVED
AUG itt,- liM

THIRD DISTRIC': COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

JO).Ul B. BOOTE,

MINUTE ENTRY

Pla1ntiff,

v.

CASE NO. 874902929
JUPGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD

JOHN W. BOOTH,

Defendants.

Oral arguments on the "Trustee's Motion To Quash The Writ of,

G,arnishntent" were heard on July 12, 2004.

At the conclusion o.f

arguments, the Court took the matter under advisement.
Now, upon further

quas~es

TrUstee's mot2on and
i~

cons~deration,

che Court hereby grants the

:he wr1t of garnishment.

based, in part, upon plaintiff's execution of an

2004,

"Accep~anoe

specifically, in that

-Inheritance and General Release."
dated February 14,

This ruling
of<

docume~

plaintiff released both the trust and-

t:ru.stee from "any and all" future claims and liability.
By law,

.be

'

presumed

de£endant's

afteY f1ve years w1thout contact,
deceased

the

trust

shall

be

will

distributed .• ecr

ch~ldren per stirpes.

The Trustee's
consistent

and

~he ce:er~ant

w~tt

ttis

counsel
M~~ute

is

requested

E~try,

I

for

to

prepare

sub~~ssion

an

Order

to the Court.

BOOTH V. BOOTH

PAGE 2

Dated this

----

MINUTE ENTRY

day of

BY THE COURT:

STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
~!STRICT

COURT JUDGE

1::1: ~4.

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

SEP 1~ 2tJJit
E
By

-

UNTY
~

DePUtYCiet~c
Rick L. Sorensen (7631)
HAWKINS & SoRENsEN, LC
Centennial Plaza, Suite 309
45 West 10000 South
Sandy, Utah 84070
SEP 1j . ,
Telephone: (801) 233-0031
Facsimile: (80 I) 233-0032
Attorneys for Brent Theodbre Booth. Trustee ofthe Charlotte Booth Revocable Trust

RECEIVED

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOAN B. BOOTH.

Plaintiff.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
QUASH

v.

JOHN W. BOOTH,
Civil No D-87-0-2929

Defendant.
BRENT THEODORE BOOTH, TRUSTEE

OF THE CHARLOTTE BOOTH
REVOCABLE TRUST,

Garnishee.
This matter came on for heanng on a .\1otion to Quash \\tnt ofGam1shment filed by Brent
Theodore Booth. Trustee of the Charlotte Booth Revocable Trust (hereinafter -Trustee} on Ju1y
'

12.2004. The Honorable Stephen L. Henriod presided at the hearing. Rick L Sorensen

.represented Trustee and Russell M. Blood represented Plaintiff Joan B Booth. The Court,
having reviewed the memoranda submitted by both parties, and having heard the arguments by

counsel, hereby
ORDERS, DECREES and ADJUDGES as follows:
1.

Trustee's Motion to Quash is granted and the Writ of Garnishment is quashed

2.

Pursuant to section 75-l-101(e) of the Utah Code, Defendant will be presumed

dead after 5 years without contact andthe-ttust-sballabe ~ Qefendant.!g.dHidren.per.
stirpes after the five year period.

DATEDthis

L(' dayof ~

.2004.

BYTHECOURT

/]
The Honorable Stephen L. Henriod
Thjrd District Judicial Court Jud

--~~

Approved as to form
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FAX NO. 80l23Br564

P. 02

F. . IIITIIOTCGUIJ
Thfrd Judlc(al District

Rick L. Sorensen (7631)
HA WKJNS & SORENSEN, LC
CentenrUal Plaza, Suite 309
45 West 10000 South
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 233·0031
Facsimile: (801) 233-0032

Altorneysj()r Brenl Theod<Jre Booth. Trustee ojrhe Chatlotte Booth Revocable Trust
JN THE THIRD DISTRJCT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR

SALT LAKE COUNT\', STATI OF UTAH
JOAN B. BOOTH,

ORDER DENYING MOTION
Plainti:ff,

v.
JOHN W. BOOTH,

PURSUANT TO RULE 59(A)(7) FOR

RECONSIDERATION OR NEW
TRIAL ON THE COURT'S ORDER
QUASIDNG WRIT OF
GARNISHMENT

Defendant,

BRENT THEODO~ BOOTH, TRUSTEE
OF THE CHARLOTIE BOOTH
REVOCABLE TRUST,

CivU No. D-87·0·2929

Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Garnishee.
This matter came on for hearins on Dc:cembcr 29, 2004, on Plaintiff's Motion PurSlWlt to
Rule S9(a)(7) for Reconsideration or New Trial on the Court's Order Quashing Writ of

Gamisbment (hereinafter "Piaint.Urs Motion"). The Honorable Stephen L. Henriod presided at
the hearing. Rick L. Soreusen represented Trustee Brent Theodore Booth (hereinafter "Trustee")

and Russell M Blood represented Plaintift' Joan B. Booth. The Court, having reviewed the

memol'lUlda submitted by both parties, and having heard the argumentS by counsel, hereby

FAX NO. 80123afb64

MAR-03-2005 THU 01:38PM CRIMINAL DEPT

P. 03

ORDERS, DECUES and ADJUDGES as follows:
On August 2, 2004, in a Minute Entry, this Court granted Trustee's motion to quash the
writ of garnishment bccaWIC: (1) plainti1frelcased the Trust from any IU'ld aU future claims of

liability pliJ'SUant to the execution of an ''Acceptance of Inheritance & General Release;" and (b)
by law after five years the defeudant will be presumed deceased and the money will go to

decedent's children per stirpes. PJaintitfmoved the Court to reconsider its prior ruling.
In order to grant the Motion For Reconsideration. the Court must cQnclude that its prior
Minute Entry e:ntered August 2, 2004, was incorrect, ic. that the tc:lm$ of the General Release are

limited and only effect plaintiff's right to payment as bePeticiary oftbe Trust- not her claims
against her ex-husband for child SUppOrt.
The Court, however, determines that its prior ruling was appropriate in lieu oftbe Trust's

spendthrift tiust provision and tbc ial;t that the distribution to defendant has not yet occurred. See
Utah Code Ann.§ 15·1·502.

DATIID Ibis ...JfL day of

~

, 200S.
BY THE COURT

Approved as lo form:

Russell M Blood
Attorney for Plaintiff Joan B. Booth
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ACCEPTANCE OF INHERITANCE
AND
GENERAL RELEASE

2

In consideration of 5:/'t?,/IJ received by me this day and other consideration,
the value and receipt of which~ hereby acknowledged, 1:
1.

Acknowledge that :atent. Theodore Booth bas acted with fidelity, diligence
and integrity in administering the Charlotte Booth Revocable Trust;

2.

Acknowledge and accept the amount stated above as the correct and
appropriate amount due me under the terms of the Trust;

3.

By my signature below, covenant not to sue the Charlotte Booth Revocable
Trust or its Trustee, Brent Theodore Booth, and agree that this document shall
serve as a "General Release" of the Trust and Trustee named from any and all
liability, claim or demand whatsoever; and

4.

I agree and covenant to hold the above Trust and Trustee harmless and
indemnify them fully, including attorneys fees.

Dated this

P/

day of

&.6 ·

, 20t13.

Print~hl
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
by

810104

tJJJ?rr.J P . &OTH

A

day of__.;;,;:...41/b~~·_____., 20/E2_,

DECLARATION OFTlWST AND AGREEMENT
1HIS DECLARATION OF TRUST AND AGREEMENT made this J_l_
day of~

t'Jfif, between CH.ARL01TE BROWN BOOm of West Jordan,

Utah, hereinafter NCharlotte Brown Booth"

Ol"

"Settlor" and Charlotte Brown Booth

of West Jord.an, Utah, hereinafter referred to a;; 'lrustee".
The initial pages of this Trust document are referred to as "general
provisions." Incorporated into this document are certain "technical provisions".
To the extent that the general provisions of this Trust are inconsistent with the
technical provisions, the technical proyisions shall in every instance govern the

construction, interpretation, and operatipn of the Trust.

Accordingly, the

dispositive provisions of these "general provisi()dS" are intended only to give a brief
outline of some of the important provisions of this Trust.

GENERAL PROVISIONS
1.

Name Qf Trust. This Trust shall be known as the "Charlotte .

Booth Revocable Trust"
2.

Statement as to Family. Settlor is widowed.

Settlor's children

now living are as follows:

Date of Birth

Name

John Wilford Booth
Kathleen Hansen
Brent Theodore Booth
Charleen Packer
Stephen Page Booth
Carol Koller

Novembel' 9, 1940
September 25, 1942
February 25,1945
October 30, 1947

Deceased
December 25, 1951

Settlor intends the provisions of this Trust to apply to such children as well as any
children subsequently bom to or legally adopted by Settlor. Trustee may rely on
such dates of birth for any purpose.
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3.

General

SdJeme of DispoBtion Jlp.pn DeatiJ. Upon the death of

the Settlor the Trust Estate shall be distributed to Settlor's children in equal shares,
per stirpes.
4..

Trustee Provisions
A.

Appointmen$.

The Settlor hereby appoints and

nominates Charlotte Brown Booth, of West Jordan, Utah, as Trustee of the Trust
created hereunder.
B.

Succ;essor T{Ustec· If the Trustee hereinbefore named

should fail or cease to serve for any reason, then I appoint any one of the persons
and/or institutions hereinafter named to serve as Trustee, my preference in their

appointment being in the order named:

5.

1.

Brent Theodore Booth, of Riverton, Utah

2.

Charleen Packer, of Draper, Utah

Revocable Natgre, of Tt,US.t- During Settlor's lifetime this Trust

can be amended or revoked in whole or in part at any time by the Settlor.
TECHNICAL PROVISIONS

6.

Trust Estate.

Simultaneously with the execution of this

Declaration of Trust and Agreementr the Settlor does hereby gratuitously transfer to
the Trustee (without any consideration therefor) Settlor's entire right, title and
imelest in and to the assets more fully desaibed in Schedule •A• and does hereby
name the Trustee as beneficiaty of the insu1'ance polides or employee benefit plans
listed on Schedule "'8•, which schedules ate attached hereto and by this reference
made a part hereof. The assets listed on Schedule •A" and the proceeds received
from the insurance policies or employee benefit plans listed on Schedule "B" and all

other property which may be received by the Trustee hereunder shall constitute the

Trust :Estate of this Trust and shall be held, managed and distributed as hereinafter

provided. The transfers and designations hereby made shall be deemed effective
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immediately upon the execution of this Agreement even tnoug..n 111rt.her
ministerial acts may be necessary to effect the changes in the records of the issuers of
the policies. The Trustee acknowledges receipt of the assets listed on Schedule "A"
and the designation as beneficiary of the policies or employee benefit plans listed on

Schedule "B".
7.

Children and Adoption. Settlor intends the provisions of this

Trust to apply to Settlor's children living at the time of the execution of this Trust,

as hereinbefore set forth, as well as any children subsequently hom to or legally
adopted by Settlor.

8.

Bight§ Reserved by Settlor. While not under any legal disability,

Settlor reserves the right to amend or revoke the Trust under this Agreement, in
whole or in part, at any time or times, by a writing delivered to Trustee during

Settlor's life, and such alteration, amendment, modification or revocation shall be
effective immediately upon delivery to the Trustee. The Settlor may, by written

instrument signed and delivered to the Trustee, withdraw any property owned by
Settlor or policy owned by Settlor without approval or consent of anyone. Upon the
death of the Settlor, the trusts created herein shall become irrevocable.

9.

J)i&position During Sgttlor'a Life. During Settlor's life, Trustee

shall pay or apply the net income and principal of the Trust Estate as Settlor may
direct from time to time, but until otherwise directed,

Trustee shall pay

the net

income to the Settlor at least monthly- H in Trustee's sole and absolute judgment,
Settlor is so incapacitated by reason of illness, age or other cause that the Settlor is
incapable of expending funds for Settlor's own use and benefit or is unavailable to

give prompt attention to Settlor's financial affairs, the Trustee may use so much of
the net income and principal of the Trust Estate as Trustee in its sole and absolute

discretion deems necessary or advisable (i) for the support, maintenance, health,
comfort and welfare of Settlor, Settlor's children or grandchildren, or any person
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which, in the sole judgment of Trustee, is dependent upon Settlor, (ii) for the

payment of premiums on any insurance policies owned by Settlor, whether or not
subject to the terms of this Trust Agreement, and (iii) for the purpose of discharging

any obligation incurred by Settlor and believed by Trustee to be a valid debt. Any
income not so used shall be accumulated and added to principal from time to time.

10.

Additional Property. The Settlor, or any other person may by

gift, testamentary disposition or otherwise, make additional contributions of cash or

property to this Trust or may name the Trustee beneficiary on additional insurance
policies or benefit plans, and when accepted by the Trustee, said property shall be
administered by the Trustee under the terms and conditions hereof.

11.

Qispositiou Upon Settlor'$ Death ;md IerminatiQn.
A.

Taxes. Qebm. Funeral & Administration Expenm;. Upon

the death of the Settlor, the Trustee in its discretion may pay to the duly qualified

personal representative of the Settlor's estate an amount equal to all or part of the
Settlor's debts and expenses of Settlor's last illness, funeral, burial and the
administration costs involved in handling the Settlor's estate, together with all
estate, inheritance, succession or other death taxes, including any penalties and
interest thereon, which are due by reason of Settlor's death. Written statements by

the personal representatives of the sums that must be paid shall be sufficient
evidence of their amounts, and Trustee shall be under no duty to see to the
application of any such payments.
B.

Disposition Upon Termination. Upon termination, the

Trustee shall distribute the then remaining principal and all accumulated and

acaued but undistributed income as follows:
(i)

To Settlor's children in equal shares, per stirpes, to

be determined by the Trustee. If at the time of the distribution, any child of Settlor is

deceased with no issue then living, then the share of such child shall be distributed
equally to Se1tlor's other children, per stirpes.
(ii)

In the event none of the Settlor's descendants is

then living or if at any time there is no person or entity qualified to receive

final

distribution of the Trust Estate or any part of it, then any such portion of the Trust
Estate to which such failure of qualified recipients has occurred shall be distributed
to the Settlor's heirs at law.

C

Distributions to Minors. If any beneficiary to whom

Trustee is directed to distribute any share of Trust principal is under the age of
twenty-one (21) years when the distribution is to be made, Trustee may in its
discretion continue to hold such beneficiary's share as a separate Trust until he
reaches the age of twenty-one (21) years, or until the prior expiration of twenty-one
(21) years after the death of the survivor of Settlor's descendants who were living at
Settlor's death, when Trustee shall distribute such beneficiazy's share to him. If
such beneficiary dies before that time, Trustee shall upon his death, distribute his

share to his then living descendants_, per stirpes, or if none, to his surviving spouse,
or if none, to the then living descendants, per stirpes, of that parent of the
beneficiary who was a child of Settlor, or if none,. to Settlor's then living
descendants, per stirpes. While any Trust is being held under this Paragraph ll(C),

Trustee may pay to, or apply for the benefit of, the beneficiary for whom the Trust is
held such amounts of the net income or principal, or both, as Trustee may
determine to be necessarv or advisable for such beneficiary's suppott maintenance.

health, and education, after taking into consideration all of the resources known to
Trustee to be available for such purposes. Any undistributed income may be added
to principal from time to time in the discretion of Trustee.
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12.

Imnination of

Trust.

Support aruj Maintenance of Disabled Children. Notwithstand-

ing anything herein contained to the contrary, if any of the Settlor's children
become physically or mentally disabled, and the Trustee in its sole discretion
determines that such child is unable to support and maintain himself, and this
Trust would otherwise terminate as provided in Paragraph 13 herein, the Trustee
shall continue to hold in Trust and reinvest sufficient principal of the Trust for the

purpose of providing necessary support and maintenance for any such mentally or

physically disabled child. The amount of principal or income not needed, if any, to
support a disabled child shall be paid to the beneficiaries of this Trust~ as provided in

Paragraph ll(B) herein. If, in the sole discretion of the Trustee, a disabled child is
able to support himself, this Trust shall terminate as provided herein. It is the
Settlor's intention that a mentally or physically disabled child should receive
benefits under this Paragraph 12 only if the Trust would otherwise terminate.

13.

Termination- Except as provided in this Trust with reference to

the Support and Maintenance of Disabled Children, this Trust shall terminate upon
the death of Settlor. Notwithstanding the above, if any Trust hereunder, in the
absolute discretion of the Trustee, becomes sufficiently small in value that the
administration thereof is no longer economically desirable, the cost thereof is
disproportionate to the value of the assets, or the continuation thereof is no longer
in the best interest of the beneficiary or beneficiaries, the Trustee may terminate

such Trust. Upon said termioation, the Trustee shall distribute the property of such

Trust as otherwise provided in this Agreement.
14.

Trust. Admjnhrtrative. and Protective Proyisioll§.
A.

Inalienability and Spendthrift.

Except as otherwise

provided herein, no beneficiary shall have any right to anticipate, sell, assign,
mortgage, pledge, or otherwise dispose of or encumber all or any part of the Trust
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Estate nor shall any part of the Trust Estate, including income, be liable for the debts

or obligations, including alimony, of any beneficiary or be subject to attachment,

garnishment, execution, creditor's bill~ or other legal or equitable process.
B.

Undistn"buted IncQJDe at Death of Beneficiary. Upon the

death of any beneficiary entitled to receive income, all accrued or undistributed

income held for the attotmt of such beneficiary shall be treated as if it had accrued or
been received immediately following the death of 5Uch beneficiary.
C

Situs of the Trust. The validity of this Trust shall be

determined under the laws of the State of Utah, United States of America.
Questions of construction and administration of this Trust shall be determined

under the laws of the situs of administration.
D.

Protection Against

fe}:petui~ Rule•• This

Trust shall in

any event terminate not later than twenty-one {21) years after the death of the last
survivor of the group composed of Settlor, and those of Settlor's descendants living

at Settlor's death.. The property held in Trust shall be distributed to the persons then

entitled to the income, in the proportion in which they are beneficiaries of such
income, and for this purpose only it shall be presumed that any persons then
entitled to receive any discretionary payments from the income or principal of any
particular Trust is entitled to receive the full income, and that any class of persons
so entitled is entitled to receive all such property, to be divided among them per

stirpes. No power of appointment granted hereunder shall be so exercised as to
~late

any applicable Rule Against Perpetuities, accumulations or any similar rule

or law and any attempted exercise of any such power which violates such Rule or
Law shall be void, notwithstanding any provisions of this Trust to the contrary.

E.

Am>unting. Trustee shall keep and maintain exact and

proper records reflecting the income, disbu,rsements and principal of the Trust.
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Annual balance sheets and income statements shall be fumished to each beneficiary

or to his or her personal representative, if any.
15.

Trqstee Powers. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement

relating to the powers reserved by the Settlor, the Trustee shall have and exercise
exclusive management and control of the Trust, and shall be vested with the
following specific powers and discretion, in addition to the powers as IllClY be
generally conferred from time to time upon Trustee by Law:
A.

In administering any Trust under this Agreement,

Trustee may exercise the following powers: to hold, retain, invest, reinvest and
manage without diversification as to kind, amount or risk of non-productivity in
realty or personalty and without limitation by statute or rule of law; to partition,

sell, exchange, grant, convey, deliver, assign, transfer, lease, option, mortgage,
pledge, abandon, borrow, loan, contract, distribute in cash or kind or partly in each at
fair market value on the date of distribution and without requiring pro rata

distribution of specific assets, hold in nominee form, continue businesses, carry out
agreements, deal with itself, other fiduciaries and business organizations in which
Trustee may have an interest, establish reserves, release powers and abandon, settle
or contest claims.
B.

If the situs of administration of the Trust is in Utah,

Trustee may also exercise all the powers in the Uniform Trustees• Powers
Provisions of the Utah Unifonn Probate Code as set forth in Utah Code Annotated
Section 75-7-402, as amended, after the execution of this Agreement and after

Settlor's death. If the situs of administration of the Trust is outside Utah, Trustee
may also exercise all the powers in the said provisions which Settlor incorporates in
this Agreement as the Act exists on the date of this Agreement. Further, the Trustee

may determine what is principal and what is income of any Trust and apportiop
and allocate in its discretion its receipts, taxes and other expenses and charges
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between the two. A separate income account need not be maintained_ Any income
not distributed in accordance with the provisions hereof shall become principaL
C.

The powers herein granted to the Trustee may be

exercised in whole or in part, from time to time, and shall be deemed to be
supplementary to, and not exclusive of, the general powers of Trustees pursuant to
law, and shaH include ali powers necessary to carry the same into effect. The
powers, duhes and responsibilities stated h.erein shall not be deemed to exclude
other implied powers, duties or responsibilities not inconsistent herewith and any
successor Trustee shall succeed to the same rights, powers, duties and
responsibilities provided herein as the Trustee hereinbefore named.

16.

Trustee Provisions.

A.

Resignation. Any Trustee may resign by giving thirty (30)

days \VTitten notice to each adult beneficiary,, or if none, to the guardian, parent or
other person having the right of custody of each minor beneficiary, then eligible to

receive current income, effective at the end of said thirty (30) days.
B.
or cease to serve or

i1Ct

Successor Trustee. If all of the herein named Trustces fail
as Trustee, a majority in number of the beneficiaries then

eligible to receive curn...-'llt income shall appoint by a \VTiting within thirty (30) days a
successor Trustee. If no successor Trustee is appointed within thirty {3(}} days, any

beneficiary may petition ex parte any court of competent jurisdiction to name a
By making such appointment, such court shall not acquire

successor Trustee.

jurisdiction over the Trust. Any successor Trustee must be a bank organized under
the laws of any state or of the United States having total assets of at least One
Hundred Million Dollars and maintaining a fu.ll time Trust department, and

insured by the Federal Government.
C

Rights of Successor Trustees. Every successor Trustee

shall haYe all the title, rights, powers, privileges, and duties conferred or imposed
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upon the original Trustee, without any act of conveyance or transfer. No fiduciary
need examine the accounts, records and acts of any previous fiduciary or any
allocation of the Trust Estate nor be responsible fot any act or omission to act on the
part ot any previous fiductary.
D.

Bonds and Compensation. Settlor, having confidence in the

Trustee and any successor appointed herein, hereby directs that any Trustee
hereunder shall serve without giving bond or security and without obtaining any
order from or approval of any court and without notice to or consent of anyone.

The Trustee and any successor Trustee shall be entitled to receive a fair and just
compensation for its services hereunder, as allowed by the laws of the State of Utah.
17.

Jnaur.ance Provi&jona.
A.

Settlor's Right.&.

All benefits, rights, privileges, and

options available to Settlor during Settlor's lifetime as the owner of or the insured
under the insurance policies Qf which Trustee ,js beneficiary shall be retained by
Settlor for Settlor's sole benefit regardless of the terms of this Agreement and of the
fact that the Trustee is named as beneficiary in the policies and shall not be subject to

, the Trust. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, Settlor may exercise any
right in the policies, including the right to change the beneficiary, surrender, cancel,

borrow on, or receive dividends from the policies, and make any elections or
exercise any option granted in such policies, all without notice to or consent by
Trustee or any beneficiary of tbe Trust.

B.

Payment of Premiums. The Trustee shall be under no

obligation to pay the premiums which may become due and payable under the
provisions of any policy of insurance which is an asset of this Trust or to make
certain that such premiums am paid by the Trustor or others or to notify any person

of nonpayment of Such premiums, and the Trustee shall be under no responsibility
or liability of any kind in case such premiums are not paid, except that it may apply
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any dividends received by it on such policy, or any other Trust assets for the

payment of premiums thereon. Upon receipt of notice at any time during the
continuance of this Trust that the premiums due upon such policy are in default or
that premiums to become due will not be paid, either by the Settlor or by any other
persons, the Trustee, within its sole discretion, may apply any cash values
attributable to such policy to the purchase of paid-up insurance or of extended
insurance or may borrow upon such policy for the payment of the premiums due
thereon or may accept the cash value of such policy upon its forfeiture.

C

Collection of Proceeds. On Settlor's death, Trustee shall

collect the proceeds of all the policies of insurance upon Settlor's life and all
employee death benefits payable to Trustee. Payment to Trustee and the receipt for
payment by Trustee shall constitute a full release and discharge of the liability of a
payor and no payor need inquire into or take notice of this instrument or see to the
application of such payment. Trustee may, and upon being indemnified to its
satisfaction against all cost and expenses shall litigate as necessary to enforce
payment of the policies.
18.

Definitions.
A.

Descendants.

"Descendants" and/ or "issue" means

children and other lineal descendants whether natural or adopted. It is intended

that all adopted children of any person shall be treated as natural and legitimate
children for all purposes whatsoever, provided that such adoption is by legal

proceeding before the child's twenty-first {21) birthday.
B.

Per Stirpes. "Per stirpesw means to take, by representation

strictly construed, the share which a deceased ancestor would have taken had such
ancestor survived the event specifically named or indicated, with the stirpes or
stocks being Settlor's children, except that, if all the takers are in equal degree of
kinship, they shall take per capita.
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C.

~ A person

reaches or attains any specified age (for

example 25) at the first moment of the day of his or her equivalent birthday (for
example 25th birthday). A person born on February 29th shall be deemed to have
been born on February 28th for purposes of this clause.

D.

TnvUee.

"Trustee"

may be read as "Trustees" and "Trust"

may be read as "Trusts" in all cases where appropriate, and vice versa.
E.

Pronouns.

Number and Gender.

The singular shall be

interpreted as the plural, and vice versa, if such treatment is necessary to interpret

this Trust in accord with the Settlor's manifest intention. Likewise, if either the

feminine, masculine, or neuter gender should be one of the other genders, it shall
be so treated.

F.

Pmgraph Headinp. The paragraph and sub-paragraph

headings used herein are merely for identification purposes and shall not be
considered in the interpretation of this Trust.
19.

Lep.l

Matters·

In all matters concerning the Trusts herein

established, Settlor suggests that the Trust employ as its attomey Gregory P. Hawkins
of Salt Lake City, Utah.
20.

Declaration of Settlor. The undersigned Settlor named in the

foregoing Declaration of Trust does hereby certify that Settlor has read this
Declaration of Trust and Agreement, and that the same fully and accurately sets out
the terms, Trusts and conditions under which the Trust Estate therein described is to

be held, managed and disposed of by the Trustee therein named, and Settlor does
hereby approve, ratify and confirm this Declaration of Trust and Agreement in all
particulars.
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IN WI1NESS WHEREOF, Settlor and Trustee have executed this
Declaration of Trust and Agreement the day and year first above written.

SETTLOR:

~~l?n4v

Charlotte Brown Booth

TRUSTEE:

Charlotte Brown Booth
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